The Jeddah Agreement, which is the latest ceasefire deal regarding the war in Yemen, is not one that will see the Houthi rebels lay down their arms. Instead, the Saudi Arabia and UAE-sponsored agreement seeks to end the long-simmering fight that escalated sharply in August between the Southern Transitional Council and pro-Hadi forces, which comprise the bulk of the anti-Houthi coalition. While the signing of this deal will not see an end to the war, it is an essential step to begin addressing the political fragmentation that would undoubtedly see any future political settlement with the Houthis break down if left to fester.
Fighting between pro-STC military forces and pro-Hadi forces—including military units loyal to notorious strongman Ali Mohsen al-Ahmar—is still being reported in Shabwa but most other areas have calmed (Alayyam, October 22). Delegations from both sides, however, have been meeting in Jeddah and are moving closer to finalizing a deal to freeze the conflict by determining an agreeable means for securing and governing Southern Yemen, at least for the duration of the broader war against the Houthis.
The signing of the Jeddah Agreement will at the least freeze the conflict, and it creates a potential stepping stone toward more comprehensive achievements, but there is still much hanging in the balance. The success of the Jeddah Agreement will hinge on the government positions STC leaders are appointed to and the leeway they are given in local administration, among myriad other factors.
At the same time, the agreement is likely to set the STC up to demand greater concessions in the future by formalizing it within the government. Similarly, the agreement will see the STC become increasingly legitimized while other Southern groups will remain outside of the political milieu.
Transferring the command of STC forces to the government is a positive short-term fix, but doing so will not erase their allegiances, animosity toward the Muslim Brotherhood-affiliated Islah party, or goals for an independent Southern Yemen, and neither will it ensure that they act in the interest of the government for the duration of the agreement.
____________
Originally published by the Washington, D.C.-based institute for research and analysis Jamestown Foundation under the title Implications of the Jeddah Agreement on the War in Yemen